

Doc. No. 2156 B

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Excerpt from Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, 1 February 1946,
pages 16, 17, 18, 21, 22.

Q. When did you first become acquainted with RIBBENTROP?

A. In 1935, for the first time.

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Q. What was the occasion for these numerous meetings with RIBBENTROP in 1936?

A. In 1936 we concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was finally signed by Ambassador MUSHAKOJI, but I had a good many talks on matters preceding the final settlement.

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Q. Had you ever discussed with Mr. HACK the subject matter of this proposed alliance against Russia with Germany?

A. Yes, I had discussed with him, and in this regard, if you desire, I shall tell you of the events leading up to this pact in detail . . . I shall tell you all I know about this pact, including secret matters pertaining to it. To start with it was in the spring of 1935, in May or June, I believe, that HACK came to me and said the following was RIBBENTROP's own idea and had nothing to do with the policy of the German government, but would there not be a possibility of some sort of defensive alliance against Russia between Germany and Japan. In this regard they knew that the Japanese army had penetrated into Manchuria and might have an interest in such an alliance - the reason for this being that the army was on the borders of the U.S.S.R.

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Q. Did you have an idea that probably HACK would carry these ideas back to RIBBENTROP?

A. Naturally, I thought so. However, I could not definitely give any answers, unless I knew exactly how GHQ felt.

Q. Continue with the story.

A. Subsequent to this RIBBENTROP said that he wished to see me and I met him for the very first time at HACK's home in October of that year. At this meeting RIBBENTROP said that this was simply his own idea and he did not know how Hitler or the Government felt about it, and he said further that he believed there would be some possibility of its being put into effect. However, he asked me what the Japanese military would think about it, and I said that there was no way of knowing, so that he asked me to find out exactly how they would feel.

and he asked me to communicate with the Japanese military and find out how they would feel about it. I subsequently sent the telegram to GHQ about the matter. At this time RIBBENTROP stressed the fact that this was his own personal idea and for me not to feel bad about matters in case the German Government did not back him up - I said the same thing in regard to my own Government.

Q. This is the second communication to Tokyo relative to this proposal?

A. Yes.

Q. Continue.

A. (HACK was at this meeting and there were just the three of us.) Following this communication of mine to Japan I received the reply from GHQ that there was no overall opposition to the proposal, but that they wished to look into matters more fully before they committed themselves, and in this regard they would send Lt. Col. WAKAMATSU of the German Division of GHQ. This officer arrived in Berlin in early December 1935, I believe, although I am not too sure of dates. During this interim I did not have any communication with RIBBENTROP.

Q. Did you have any communication with your own Foreign Office relative to this communication?

A. No. This was simply a military matter. Prior to Lt. Col. WAKAMATSU's arriving in Berlin HACK came to see me several times and I told him that he should wait until the arrival of the abovementioned officer. When he came I took the Colonel to see RIBBENTROP and also General BLOMBERG and WAKAMATSU told them that GHQ was in favor of a more or less general treaty, but that it was his duty, as this was still given only as RIBBENTROP's personal idea, to find out what the German Government felt about it. Also WAKAMATSU stated that while the Japanese Army favored it, to bring it into fruition the Government would have to be consulted.

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EXCERPT FROM INTERROGATION OF OSHIMA, HIROSHI, 1 February 1946, pp. 18, 19.

- A. I wish to point out to you that the Japanese military and naval attaches are not under the jurisdiction of the ambassador, but are directly responsible to the respective staff headquarters in Tokyo. As far as the embassy goes, they are under the ambassador, but as far as their duties go they are responsible to their military superiors in Tokyo.
- Q. Are they authorized by virtue of their position as military attache to enter into negotiations with the military of another nation, looking towards a pact or a treaty or an international agreement between the two nations?
- A. Yes, if it was a strictly military matter they may discuss these matters without going through the ambassador... Before I go any further I would like to stress here that they were sounding out the opinion of the Japanese army and not that of the Japanese government because if they had been that would have been the ambassador's duty.
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- Q. Is it not also a fact that if Ribbentrop or any one else in Germany could sell the military of Japan on this idea that the military was then probably in a position whereby they could persuade the Foreign Office to go along with the idea?
- A. Yes, that is one point and quite true that the army had enough power to very probably sell the pact to the Japanese government. The second point is the one I stressed before that Ribbentrop was not in an official capacity at the time. Particularly, in this point, he had seen how the Japanese army had taken possession of Manchuria and, therefore, naturally, concluded from that that the Japanese army would be in the strongest position to push a treaty of this type ... I would say that no treaty could possibly have been made on this if the army had not wished it.